Introduction
There is a broad consensus among most European leaders and in Brussels on the importance of structural reforms to foster innovation-based growth in Europe. However, this consensus has not reached the European public at large. One recent example is France, where the timid reforms proposed by the Economy Minister have met opposition from all political parties. So often do we hear that structural reforms amount to austerity, and therefore are detrimental to growth and employment. Similarly, a commonly held view is that going for supply side policies (structural reforms or …scal devaluations aimed at fostering such reforms) necessarily means that we have decided to ignore the demand side. We also hear that a …scal system conducive to innovation and entrepreneurship would necessarily aggravate inequality and reduce social mobility. The purpose of this survey is twofold: …rst, to bring the reader up to speed with recent research in the Economics of Innovation and Growth; second, to provide the reader with theoretical and empirical background to think about growth policy design in EU countries.
We should emphasize right away that this survey is opinionated in the sense that it re ‡ects our own biases and uses the lenses of our own work. However, the reader should feel free (and is welcome) to disagree and take issue with the models, analyses and statements outlaid in the next sections. Our main purpose is indeed to encourage debates and criticisms and to inspire future work on the subject, in particular contributions that involve creative destruction of our own work.
In particular, we will propose some answers to questions such as:
1. What distinguishes innovation-led growth from other types of growth? What are the main drivers of innovation-led growth? (Why) is innovation necessary for sustained long-run growth? What are the main levers that governments should activate to promote innovation-led growth?
2. Why do we need competition policy for innovation-led growth? Should that lead us to dispense with patent protection: in other words, should we oppose patent protection and competition as potential drivers of innovation-led growth? Similarly, should the need for competition policy lead us to reject any form of sectoral (or industrial) policy?
Harvard University, College de France, NBER and CIFAR y University of Chicago and NBER 3. How should we reform the welfare state in order to facilitate the transition from imitation-based (or catchup) growth and innovation-led growth? Should the state simply concentrate on "regalian" functions, i.e. law and order, education and health?
4. Should EU governments rely more on aggregate demand or on competitiveness to foster growth? Should we oppose structural reforms and the need for (more ‡exible) macroeconomic policy in enhancing growth in Europe? And how can macroeconomic policy and macro prudential regulations a¤ect innovation-led growth?
5. Should governments subsidize R&D to foster innovation-led growth: is such government intervention necessary or su¢ cient? How should we design the tax system to make growth more "inclusive" and reconcile innovation-led growth with the need to foster social mobility and to avoid excessive inequality?
Can public subsidies always make up for a more expropriatory taxation?
6. What are the limits to patenting and intellectual property and why do we need academic freedom and openness?
The remaining part of this survey will be organized as follows. Section 2 will argue that Schumpeterian growth theory provides a relevant framework in which to analyze key aspects of innovation-led growth and to also think about growth policy design. We will contrast the predictions and policy recommendations that come out of that theory from those delivered by other growth theories (in particular the so-called AK model, and the product variety model). Section 3 discusses growth policy design. In particular, building on the previous two sections, it will draw lessons on how to foster innovation-led growth in the EU. Section 4 touches upon the recent debate on secular stagnation. Section 5 uses the lenses of Schumpeterian growth theory to provide new insights into the design of R&D policy. Section 6 looks at the organization of innovation and the role of academic freedom and openness. Section 7 concludes by suggesting avenues for future research.
Looking for growth paradigms to think about growth policy
Today's research on growth economics, with its double objective of improving our understanding of the growth process and of helping us think more systematically about growth policy design, uses essentially four leading growth paradigms.
The neoclassical growth model
The primary reference in growth economics is the neoclassical paradigm. The success of this model owes …rst to its parsimony; the growth process is described by only two equations: (i) a production equation that expresses the current ‡ow of output good as a function of the current stocks of capital and labor:
where A is a productivity parameter and where < 1 so that production involves decreasing returns to capital, and (ii) a law of motion that shows how capital accumulation depends on investment (equal to aggregate savings) and depreciation:
where sY denotes aggregate savings and K denotes aggregate depreciation.
What also makes this model the benchmark for growth analysis is, paradoxically, its implication that, in the long run, economic growth does not depend on economic conditions. In particular, economic policy cannot a¤ect a country's long-run growth rate. Speci…cally, per capita GDP Y =L cannot grow in the long run unless we assume that productivity A also grows over time, which Solow (1956) refers to as "technical progress". The problem is that in this neoclassical model, technical progress cannot be explained or even rationalized. To analyze policies for growth, one needs a theoretical framework in which productivity growth is endogenous; that is, dependent upon characteristics of the economic environment. That framework must account for long-term technological progress and productivity growth, without which diminishing marginal productivity would eventually choke o¤ all growth.
The AK model
The …rst version of endogenous growth theory is the so-called AK theory, which does not make an explicit distinction between capital accumulation and technological progress. In e¤ect it just lumps together the physical and human capital whose accumulation is studied by neoclassical theory with the intellectual capital that is accumulated when technological progress is made. When this aggregate of di¤erent kinds of capital is accumulated there is no reason to think that diminishing returns will drag its marginal product down to zero, because part of that accumulation is the very technological progress needed to counteract diminishing returns.
According to the AK paradigm, the way to sustain high growth rates is to save a large fraction of GDP, some of which will …nd its way into …nancing a higher rate of technological progress and will thus result in faster growth.
Formally, the AK model is the neoclassical model without diminishing returns. The theory starts with an aggregate production function that is linear homogeneous in the stock of capital:
with A a constant. If capital accumulates according to the same equation:
as before, then the economy's long-run (and short-run) growth rate is
which is increasing in the saving rate s.
AK theory presents a "one size …ts all"view of the growth process. It applies equally to countries that are on the leading edge of the world technology frontier and to countries that are far behind. Like the neoclassical model, it postulates a growth process that is independent of developments in the rest of the world, except insofar as international trade changes the conditions for capital accumulation. Yet, it is a useful tool for many purposes when the distinction between innovation and accumulation is of secondary importance.
The product-variety model
The second wave of endogenous growth theory consists of so-called "innovation-based" growth models, which themselves belong to two parallel branches. One branch is the product variety model of Romer (1990) , in which innovation causes productivity growth by creating new, but not necessarily improved, varieties of products.
This paradigm grew out of the new theory of international trade, and emphasizes the role technology spillovers.
It starts from a Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) production function of the form:
in which there are N t di¤erent varieties of intermediate product, each produced using K it units of capital. By symmetry, the aggregate capital stock K t will be divided up evenly among the N t existing varieties equally, which means we can re-express the production function as:
According to this function, the degree of product variety N t is the economy's aggregate productivity parameter, and its growth rate is the economy's long-run growth rate of per-capita output. Product variety raises the economy's production potential because it allows a given capital stock to be spread over a larger number of uses, each of which exhibits diminishing returns.
The fact that there is just one kind of innovation, which always results in the same kind of new product, means that the product-variety model is limited in its ability to generate context-dependent growth. In particular, the theory makes it di¢ cult to talk about the notion of technology frontier and of a country's distance to the frontier, since all intermediate products are on a technological par. "
Moreover, nothing in this model implies an important role for exit and turnover; indeed increased exit can do nothing but reduce the economy's GDP, by reducing the variety variable N t that uniquely determines aggregate productivity. Thus there is no role for "creative destruction,"the driving force in the Schumpeterian model to be discussed below.
The Schumpeterian model
The Schumpeterian paradigm (see Howitt (1992, 1998) ) grew out of modern industrial organization theory and put …rms and entrepreneurs at the heart of the growth process. The paradigm relies on three main ideas.
First idea: long-run growth relies on innovations. These can be process innovations, namely to increase the productivity of production factors (e.g. labor or capital); or product innovations (introducing new products);
or organizational innovations (to make the combination of production factors more e¢ cient).
Second idea: Innovations result from investments like research and development (R&D), …rms'investments in skills, search for new markets,...that are motivated by the prospect of monopoly rents for successful inno-
vators. An important consideration for thinking about the role for public intervention in the growth process, is that innovations generate positive knowledge spillovers (on future research and innovation activity) which private …rms do not fully internalize. Thus private …rms under laissez-faire tend to underinvest in R&D, training,...This propensity to underinvest is reinforced by the existence of credit market imperfections which become particularly tight in recessions. Hence an important role for the state as a co-investor in the knowledge economy.
Third idea: creative destruction. Namely, new innovations tend to make old innovations, old technologies, old skills, become obsolete. Thus growth involves a con ‡ict between the old and the new: the innovators of yesterday resist new innovations that render their activities obsolete. This also explains why innovation-led growth in OECD countries is associated with a higher rate of …rm and labor turnover. And it suggests a second role for the state, namely as an insurer against the turnover risk and to help workers move from one job to another. More fundamentally, governments need to strike the right balance between preserving innovation rents and at the same time not deterring future entry and innovation. This is the paradigm that we …nd most useful, and it plays an especially important role throughout the book. We present it in Chapter 4 and then use it and extend it in the subsequent chapters of the book.
More formally, Schumpeterian theory begins with a production function speci…ed at the industry level:
where A it is a productivity parameter attached to the most recent technology used in industry i at time t: In this equation, K it represents the ‡ow of a unique intermediate product used in this sector, each unit of which is produced one-for-one by …nal output or, in the most complete version of the model, by capital. Aggregate output is just the sum of the industry-speci…c outputs Y it .
Each intermediate product is produced and sold exclusively by the most recent innovator. A successful innovator in sector i improves the technology parameter A it and is thus able to displace the previous product in that sector, until it is displaced in turn by the next innovator. Thus a …rst implication of the Schumpeterian paradigm, is that faster growth generally implies a higher rate of …rm turnover, because this process of creative destruction generates entry of new innovators and exit of former innovators.
A …rst distinct prediction of Schumpeterian Growth Theory is therefore:
The turnover rate is positively correlated with the productivity growth rate.
Another distinctive implication of the model is that innovation-led growth may be excessive under laissezfaire. Growth is excessive (resp. insu¢ cient) under laissez-faire when the business-stealing e¤ect associated with creative destruction dominates (resp. is dominated by) the intertemporal knowledge spillovers from current to future innovators. 1 3 Some main applications of Schumpeterian growth theory 3 .0.1 Growth meets IO Both, empirical studies 2 and casual evidence point to a positive correlation between growth and product market competition which is at odds with what most growth models predict. The Solow and AK models assumes perfect competition, thus by construction they cannot look at how growth is a¤ected by changes in the degree of product market competition. In the product variety model, more product market competition corresponds to a higher degree of substitutability between intermediate inputs, and therefore to lower rents for potential innovators. This in turn has a detrimental e¤ect on R&D and therefore on growth.
While in Aghion and Howitt (1992) 'model also, more competition discourages innovation and growth, yet one can reconcile theory with evidence by allowing for step-by-step innovation in the Schumpeterian growth paradigm. 3 Namely, a …rm that is currently behind the technological leader in the same sector or industry must 1 Which of these e¤ects dominates will depend in particular upon the size of innovations. Assessing the relative importance of these two e¤ects in practice, requires estimating the structural parameters of the growth model using micro data (see footnote 9 catch up with the leader before becoming a leader itself. This step-by-step assumption implies that …rms in some sectors will be neck-and-neck. In turn in such sectors, increased product market competition, by making life more di¢ cult for neck-and-neck …rms, will encourage them to innovate in order to acquire a lead over their rival in the sector. This we refer to as the escape competition e¤ ect. On the other hand, in unleveled sectors where …rms are not neck-and-neck, increased product market competition will tend to discourage innovation by laggard …rms as it decreases the short-run extra pro…t from catching up with the leader. This we call the Schumpeterian e¤ ect. Finally, the steady-state fraction of neck-and-neck sectors will itself depend upon the innovation intensities in neck-and-neck versus unleveled sectors. This we refer to as the composition e¤ ect.
The Schumpeterian growth framework with step-by-step innovation, generates three interesting predictions:
The relationship between competition and innovation follows an inverted-U pattern.
Intuitively, when competition is low, innovation intensity is low in neck and neck sectors, therefore most sectors in the economy are neck and neck (the composition e¤ect); but precisely it is in those sectors that the escape competition e¤ect dominates. Thus overall aggregate innovation increases with competition at low levels of competition. When competition is high, innovation intensity is high in neck and neck sectors, therefore most sectors in the economy are unleveled sectors, so that the Schumpeterian e¤ect dominates overall. This inverted-U prediction is con…rmed by Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Gri¢ th and Howitt (2005), using panel data on UK …rms.
Prediction 2:
More intense competition enhances innovation in "frontier" …rms but may discourage it in "non-frontier" …rms.
Intuitively, a frontier …rm can escape competition by innovating, unlike a non-frontier …rm who can only catch up with the leader in its sector. This prediction is tested by Aghion, Blundell, Gri¢ th, Howitt and Prantl (2009) using again panel data of UK …rms.
Prediction 3:
There is complementarity between patent protection and product market competition in fostering innovation.
Intuitively, competition reduces the pro…t ‡ow of non-innovating neck-and-neck …rms, whereas patent protection is likely to enhance the pro…t ‡ow of an innovating neck-and-neck …rm. Both contribute to raising the net pro…t gain of an innovating neck-and-neck …rm; in other words, both types of policies tend to enhance the escape competition e¤ect. 4 This prediction is con…rmed by Aghion, Howitt and Prantl (2013) using OECD country-industry panel data. This prediction cannot be generated by the product variety model where competition can only counteract the e¤ects of better patent protection (the former reduces innovation rents whereas the latter enhances those rents).
Schumpeterian growth and …rm dynamics
The empirical literature has documented various stylized facts on …rm size distribution and …rm dynamics using micro …rm-level data. In particular: (i) the …rm size distribution is highly skewed; (ii) …rm size and …rm age are highly correlated; (iii) small …rms exit more frequently, but the ones that survive tend to grow faster than the average growth rate. 4 That competition and patent protection should be complementary in enhancing growth rather than mutually exclusive is at odds with Romer's (1990) product variety model, where competition is always detrimental to innovation and growth (as we discussed above) for exactly the same reason that intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the form of patent protection are good for innovation: namely, competition reduces post-innovation rents, whereas patent protection increases these rents. See Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) for a general analysis of optimal patent protection in Schumpeterian models with step-by-step innovation.
These are all facts that non-Schumpeterian growth models cannot account for. In particular, the …rst four facts listed require a new …rm to enter, expand, then shrink over time, and eventually be replaced by new entrants: these and the last fact on the importance of reallocation are all embodied in the Schumpeterian idea of creative destruction.
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Instead the Schumpeterian model by Klette and Kortum (2004) can account for these facts. This model adds two elements to the baseline model: …rst, innovations come from both entrants and incumbents; second, …rms are de…ned as a collection of production units where successful innovations by incumbents will allow them to expand in product space. 6 This model allows us to explain the above stylized facts:
The size distribution of …rms is highly skewed.
Recall that in this model, …rm size is summarized by the number of product lines of a …rm. Hence, a …rm needs to have succeeded many attempts to innovate in new lines and at the same survived many attempts by potential entrants and other incumbents at taking over its existing lines, in order to become a large …rm. This is turn explains why there are so few very large …rms in steady-state equilibrium, i.e. why …rm size distribution is highly skewed as shown in a vast empirical literature.
Prediction 2: Firm size and …rm age are positively correlated.
In the model, …rms are born with a size of 1. Subsequent successes are required for …rms to grow in size, which naturally produces a positive correlation between size and age. This regularity has been documented extensively in the literature.
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Prediction 3: Small …rms exit more frequently. The ones that survive tend to grow faster than average.
In the above model, it takes only one successful entry to make a one-product …rm to exit, whereas it takes two successful innovations by potential entrants to make a two-product …rm exit. The facts that small …rms exit more frequently and grow faster conditional on survival have been widely documented in the literature. 
Growth meets development
The previous two sections have implications for how Schumpeterian growth theory can help bridge the gap between growth and development economics: …rst, by capturing the idea that growth-enhancing policies or institutions vary with a country's level of technological development; second, by analyzing how institutional development (or the lack of it) a¤ects …rm size distribution and …rm dynamics.
Appropriate institutions In Section 3.1 above we mentioned some recent evidence for the prediction that competition and free-entry should be more growth-enhancing in more frontier …rms, which implies that they should be more growth-enhancing in more advanced countries since those have a larger proportion of frontier …rms. This idea can be extended to other aspects of growth policy design. Indeed, the Schumpeterian paradigm is ‡exible in modeling the contribution of past innovations. It encompasses the case of an innovation that leapfrogs the best technology available before the innovation, resulting in a new technology parameter A it in 5 In the product variety model, exit is always detrimental to growth as it reduces product variety. 6 Various versions of this framework have been estimated using micro-level data by Lentz and Mortensen (2008) For example, consider a country in which in any sector leading edge innovations take place at the frequency n and implementation innovations (or imitations) take place at the frequency m : Then the change in the economy's aggregate productivity parameter A t will be:
and hence the growth rate will be:
where:
is an inverse measure of "distance to the frontier."
Thus, by taking into account that innovations can interact with each other in di¤erent ways in di¤erent countries Schumpeterian theory provides a framework in which the growth e¤ects of various policies are highly context-dependent. In particular, the Schumpeterian apparatus is well suited to analyze how a country's growth performance will vary with its proximity to the technological frontier a t , to what extent the country will tend to converge to that frontier, and what kinds of policy changes are needed to sustain convergence as the country approaches the frontier.
We could take as given the critical innovation frequencies m and n that determine a country's growth path as given, just as neoclassical theory often takes the critical saving rate s as given. However, Schumpeterian theory goes deeper by deriving these innovation frequencies endogenously from the pro…t-maximization problem facing a prospective innovator, just as the Ramsey model endogeneizes the savings rate s by deriving it from household utility maximization. This maximization problem and its solution, will typically depend upon institutional characteristics of the economy such as property right protection, the …nancial system,...and also upon government policy; moreover, the equilibrium intensity and mix of innovation will often depend upon institutions and policies in a way that varies with the country's distance to the technological frontier a:
Equation (1) incorporates Gerschenkron's (1962) "advantage of backwardness,"in the sense that the further the country is behind the global technology frontier (i.e., the smaller is a t ) the faster it will grow, given the frequency of implementation innovations. As in Gerschenkron's analysis, the advantage arises from the fact that implementation innovations allow the country to make larger quality improvements the further it has fallen behind the frontier. As we shall see below, this is just one of the ways in which distance to the frontier can a¤ect a country's growth performance.
In addition, growth equations like (1) make it quite natural to capture Gerschenkron's idea of "appropriate institutions" 9 . Suppose indeed that the institutions that favors implementation innovations (that is, that lead to …rms emphasizing m at the expense of n ) are not the same as those that favor leading-edge innovations 9 See Acemoglu-Aghion-Zilibotti (2006) for a formalization of this idea.
(that is, that encourage …rms to focus on n ): then, far from the frontier a country will maximize growth by favoring institutions that facilitate implementation, however as it catches up with the technological frontier, to sustain a high growth rate the country will have to shift from implementation-enhancing institutions to innovation-enhancing institutions as the relative importance of n for growth is also increasing.
Thus Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006), henceforth AAZ, provide support to the following predictions using a cross-country panel of more than 100 countries over the 1960-2000 period:
Prediction 1: Average growth should decrease more rapidly as a country approaches the world frontier when openness is low.
AAZ repeat the same exercise using entry costs faced by new …rms instead of openness. They show:
Prediction 2: High entry barriers become increasingly detrimental to growth as the country approaches the frontier.
These two empirical exercises point to the importance of interacting institutions or policies with technological variables in growth regressions: openness is particularly growth-enhancing in countries that are closer to the technological frontier; entry is more growth-enhancing in countries or sectors that are closer to the technological frontier.
Next, to the extent that frontier innovation makes greater use of research education than imitation, the prediction is:
The more frontier an economy is, the more growth in this economy relies on research education.
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Finally, one can look at the relationship between technological development, democracy and growth. An important channel is Schumpeterian: namely, democracy reduces the scope for expropriating successful innovators or for incumbents to prevent new entry by using political pressure or bribes: in other words, democracy facilitates creative destruction and thereby encourages innovation. 11 To the extent that innovation matters more for growth in more frontier economies, the prediction is:
The correlation between democracy and innovation/growth is more positive and signi…cant in more frontier economies.
This prediction is con…rmed by Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi (2007) using employment and productivity data at industry level across countries and over time.
This dichotomy between catch-up growth and innovation-led growth explains why countries like China grow faster than all OECD countries: growth in China is driven by technological imitation, and when one starts far below the frontier, catching up with the frontier means a big leap forward. Second, it explains why growth policy design should not be exactly the same in developed and in less developed economies. In particular, an imitative economy does not require labor and product market ‡exibility as much as a country where growth relies more on frontier innovation. Also, bank …nance is well adapted to the needs of imitative …rms, whereas equity …nancing (venture capital,...) are better suited to the needs of an innovative …rm at 1 0 Aghion, Boustan, Hoxby and Vandenbussche (2009) show that research-type education is always more growth-enhancing in US states that are more frontier, whereas a bigger emphasis on two-year colleges is more growth-enhancing in US states that are farther below the productivity frontier. Similarly, using cross-country panel data, Vandenbussche, Aghion and Meghir (2006) show that tertiary education is more positively correlated with productivity growth in countries that are closer to the world technology frontier. The predictions, both on the delegation margin and on the …rm dynamics can be summarized as follows:
Prediction 1: Everything else equal, the probability of hiring an outside manager and, conditional on hiring, the number of outside managers is (i) increasing in …rm size, (ii) decreasing in the owner's time, and (iii) increasing in the rule of law.
Larger …rms operate with more product lines and hence they have less time from the owner directly.
Hence, the marginal contribution of an outside manager is much higher in larger …rms. The second part relates the family size to delegation. If the owner has more time (due to larger family size, for instance), then the owner has already more time to invest in his business and this lowers the demand for outside managers.
Finally stronger rule of law implies higher net return to delegation. AAP provide empirical support for these predictions using Indian manufacturing establishments. Prediction 3: Firm growth decreases in …rm size, more so when the rule of law is weaker.
This prediction follows from the fact that in larger …rms, the owner has less time to allocate in each product line and hence the frictions to delegation become much more important for large …rms. Hence, when the rule of law is weak, larger …rms have less of an incentive to grow which means that the di¤erence in growth incentives between large and small …rms will be much more pronounced in weak rule of law countries or regions. AAP
show that growth decreases faster in …rm size in low trust regions in India.
Prediction 4: Everything else equal, creative destruction and reallocation among …rms will be much higher in economies where the rule of law is stronger, thanks to the delegation possibilities.
Clearly this latter prediction is in line with the main …ndings of Hsieh and Klenow's work which showed the missing growth and reallocation in developing countries. Understanding the reasons behind the lack of reallocation and creative destruction is essential in designing the right development policies. The Schumpeterian growth framework provides a useful framework to conduct counterfactual policy exercises which can shed light on this important debate. points to three counteracting e¤ects of growth through creative destruction on the equilibrium unemployment level. While it is leading to incumbents getting replaced by new entrants and therefore release the workers of the incumbent …rm to the unemployment pool: hence a positive creative destruction e¤ ect of innovationled growth on unemployment (i.e a negative e¤ect of innovation-led growth on the equilibrium employment rate). However, new …rms entering the economy also create new jobs, hence a negative job creation e¤ ect of growth on unemployment (i.e a positive e¤ect of innovation-led growth on the equilibrium employment rate). In addition to these two e¤ects, more creative destruction implies higher growth and therefore a higher discounted value for new …rms entering the market: hence a negative capitalization e¤ ect of growth on entry.
Search frictions, innovation and growth
Whether this capitalization e¤ect increases or reduces equilibrium unemployment, depends upon which of the creative destruction and job creation e¤ects dominates. If the creative destruction e¤ect dominates, then the capitalization e¤ect will reinforce the creative destruction e¤ect. If the job creation e¤ect dominates, then the capitalization e¤ect will reinforce the job creation e¤ect. Now, when jobs can be destroyed for "exogenous" reasons, i.e. for reasons that do not have to do with innovation, then innovation becomes more a source of new job creation than mainly a source of job destruction.
More precisely, the Schumpeterian theory of growth and unemployment with search frictions, predicts that:
When the rate of exogenous destruction is small the job destruction e¤ ect dominates the job creation e¤ ect and therefore growth and unemployment should be positively correlated.
Prediction 2: When the rate of exogenous job destruction is high, then the relationship is negative growth and unemployment: in that case the job creation e¤ ect of innovation-led growth on unemployment dominates the job destruction e¤ ect. which should reduce well-being of currently employed workers. On the other hand more creative destruction implies both, more new job creation and a higher growth rate, both of which should be welfare-enhancing.
The authors generate and then test the following predictions using US data on subjective wellbeing and on job/…rm turnover:
Prediction 3: A higher turnover rate increases wellbeing more when controlling for aggregate unemployment, than when not controlling for aggregate unemployment.
Prediction 4: Higher turnover increases wellbeing more, the more turnover is associated with growthenhancing activities.
Prediction 5: Higher turnover increases wellbeing more, the more generous unemployment bene…ts are.
4 Enhancing productivity growth in advanced countries
Pillars of innovation-led growth
To enhance productivity growth in advanced countries, where growth relies more on frontier innovations, it helps to invest more in (autonomous) universities, to maximize ‡exibility of product and labour markets and to develop …nancial systems that rely importantly on equity …nancing. tic …rms that are closer to the technological frontier in their sector worldwide, compared to the median. We see that on average productivity growth in those …rms responds positively to more intense competition. This re ‡ects an "escape competition e¤ect", i.e. the fact that such …rms innovate more to escape the more intense competition. In contrast, productivity growth in …rms that are farther below the technological frontier in their sector worldwide than the median, reacts negatively to more intense competition. This re ‡ects a discouragement e¤ect: …rms far below the frontier know they have little chance to win against a potential entrant;
thus the higher the entry rate, the more discouraged such …rms are to invest in innovation and productivity growth. Now, the closer a country is to the world leading productivity level, the higher the fraction of …rms close to the corresponding technological frontier, and therefore the more productivity-enhancing is product market competition.
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Similarly, Aghion et al (2009c) show that more ‡exible labor markets (which facilitate the process of creative destruction) foster productivity growth more in more advanced countries. This is quite intuitive: the more advanced a country, the more productivity growth relies on frontier innovation. But frontier innovation in turn entails more creative destruction, and thus more job turnover, than technological catch-up.
A third lever of productivity growth in advanced countries is graduate education: indeed frontier innovation requires frontier researchers and therefore good universities and research centers, whereas good undergraduate education is su¢ cient for imitation. Figure 2, (2006))..
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A fourth lever of productivity growth is the organization of the …nancial sector. As shown by Figure 3 below (drawn from Koch, 2014), choosing a bank based …nancial system enhances productivity growth more for less advanced countries whereas choosing a more market-based …nancial system enhances productivity growth more in more frontier countries. The intuition is as follows: frontier-innovation which breaks new ground entails a higher level of risk than imitation activities which are already well de…ned. But this in turn implies that outside …nanciers involved in frontier-innovation will ask for a higher share of upside revenues and also for higher control rights: hence the role of equity in …nancing frontier innovation.
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Aghion et al (2009c) have performed cross-country panel regressions of productivity growth on the share of ICT in total value added and found a positive signi…cant coe¢ cient (see Table 5 below, …rst three columns) on ICT. In other words, everything else equal, productivity growth appears to be positively correlated to ICT di¤usion. But interestingly, once the authors control for product market regulation, the coe¢ cient on ICT becomes non-signi…cant. This in turn suggests that the positive ICT coe¢ cient mentioned above re ‡ects something more fundamental than ICT, namely, the e¤ect of liberalizing product or labor markets and of investing in research education: these policies enhance productivity growth in developed economies, in part because they facilitate the di¤usion of Information Technologies (ICT). We will come back to this point below when looking at the di¤usion of technological waves across countries. does is to lower pre-innovation rents, and also maybe post-innovation rents, although the di¤erence between post-and pre-innovation rents will increase with competition, and all the more so with stronger patents to protect post-innovation rents. 
Competition policy against industrial policy
Another fallacy, is that sectoral policies are always detrimental to competition and therefore they should always be precluded if we (justi…ably) believe in the virtues of competition for innovation-led growth. Here, our answer is that sectoral policy can be designed and governed in a way that reconciles it with the need for more product market competition.
Indeed, the "pick winner" objection against sectoral policy loses bite when vertical targeting is properly designed and governed: in particular, when: (i) the government chooses to pick activities, not particular …rms: indeed, while governments and policy makers do not have all the knowledge and wisdom needed for proper vertical selection, identifying activities with high growth potential is presumably easier than selecting individual …rms 14 ; (ii) the criteria underlying the selection of activities are clear and veri…able: in particular, recent research 15 points at skill-intensity and the degree of product market competition as relevant selection criteria for vertical targeting; (iii) the vertical interventions are properly governed: in particular, they should be governed in a way that preserves or even enhances product market competition in the corresponding sectors, and also in a way that guarantees exit from non-performing activities.
First empirical support for rethinking sectoral policy, is provided by Nunn and Tre ‡er (2009). These authors use micro data on a set of countries, to analyze whether, as suggested by the argument of "infant industry", the 1 3 In contrast, in innovation-based growth models (Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) where innovations are made by outsiders who then leap-frog incumbent …rms, the pre-innovation rent is always equal to zero, thus all what competition does in this case is to reduce the post-innovation rent which is also equal to the net innovation rent. 1 4 Activities that come to mind when talking about vertical targeting, most often pertain to the same four or …ve sectors, namely energy, biotech, ICT, transportation,.. growth of productivity in a country is positively a¤ected by the measure in which tari¤ protection is biased in favor of activities and sectors that are "skill-intensive", that is to say, use more intensely skilled workers. They …nd a signi…cant positive correlation between productivity growth and the "skill bias" due to tari¤ protection.
Of course, such a correlation does not necessarily mean there is causality between skill-bias due to protection and productivity growth: the two variables may themselves be the result of a third factor, such as the quality of institutions in countries considered. However, Nunn and Tre ‡er show that at least 25% of the correlation corresponds to a causal e¤ect. Overall, their analysis suggests that adequately designed (here, skill-intensive)
targeting may actually enhance growth, not only in the sector which is being subsidized, but also the country as a whole. explore a cross-country panel data set of patents in the automotive industry. They distinguish between "dirty innovations" which a¤ect combustion engines, and clean innovations such as those on electric cars.
Then they show that the larger the stock of past "dirty" innovations by a given entrepreneur, the "dirtier" current innovations by the same entrepreneur. This "path dependence" phenomenon, together with the fact that innovations have been mostly dirty so far, implies that in the absence of government intervention our economies would generate too many dirty innovations. Hence a role for government intervention to "redirect technical change" towards clean innovations. Indeed show that an increase in carbon price (e.g. through carbon taxes) induces …rms to redirect innovation towards clean technologies (e.g. to develop electric cars).
A reinforcing factor is the existence of credit constraints which may further limit or slow down the reallocation of …rms towards new (more growth-enhancing) activities. Now, one can argue that the existence of market failures on its own is not su¢ cient to justify vertical intervention. On the other hand, there are activities -typically high-tech activities-which generate knowledge spillovers on the rest of the economy, and where assets are highly intangible which in turn makes it more di¢ cult for …rms to borrow from private capital markets to …nance their growth.
Reforming the state
Aghion and Roulet (2011) use Schumpeterian growth theory to discuss why and how the welfare state should be reformed in the process of making the transition to an innovation-led economy. One extreme view is that the state should remain organized as it was when European countries were in a catching-up phase (from 1945 to the early 1970s). Another extreme view is that the transition from catch-up growth to innovation-led growth, should lead to a radical reform of the state, with the state withdrawing from the economy almost completely, except when it comes to law and order, national security and defense, and basic public services.
However we depart from these two extreme views on the following grounds. First, the transition to innovation-led growth, where frontier innovation is associated with creative destruction, i.e. with the constant replacement of old activities by new activities, implies that the state must give up the old industrial policies based on the support of few national champions. Instead, the state must favor and accompany the process of creative destruction, and in particular implement sectoral policies that are competition-friendly. On the other hand, the existence of knowledge externalities (reinforced by the existence of credit constraints) implies that the state cannot completely withdraw from the economy. Thus one has to look for a third way between these two extremes. This is what we refer to as the "strategic state" or the "smart state".
In particular a main issue facing countries in the euro area, particularly in its Southern part, is how to reconcile the need to invest in the main levers of innovation-led growth with that of reducing public debt and de…cits. To address the challenge of reconciling growth with greater budgetary discipline, governments and states must become strategic. This …rst means to adopt a new approach to public spending: in particular, they must depart from the Keynesian policies aimed at fostering growth though indiscriminate public spending, and instead become selective as to where public funds should be invested. They must look for all possible areas where public spending can be reduced without damaging e¤ects on growth and social cohesion: a good example are the potential savings on administrative costs: technical progress in information and communication makes it possible to decentralize and thereby reduce the number of government layers, for similar reasons as those that allowed large …rms to reduce the number of hierarchical layers over the past decades. Decentralization makes it also easier to operate a high quality health system at lower cost, as shown by the Swedish example.
Second, governments must focus public investments on a limited number of growth-enhancing areas and sectors: education, universities, innovative SMEs, labor market policies and support to labor and product market ‡exibility; industrial sectors with high growth potential and externalities as we argued above.
Third, governments must link public …nancing to changes in the governance of sectors they invest in:
how can one make sure that government funds will be appropriately used? For example, public investments in education must be conditional upon schools taking concrete steps to improve pedagogical methods and to provide individual support to students. Similarly, the necessary increases in higher education investments must be conditional upon universities going for excellence and adopting the required governance rules. For example Aghion et. al. (2010) show that investments in higher education are more e¤ective the more autonomous universities are and the more competitive the overall university system is (in particular, the more funding relies on competitive grants). encouraging …rms to invest more in R&D and innovation. This view of the role and design of macroeconomic policy departs both, from the Keynesian approach of advocating untargeted public spending to foster demand in recessions, and from the neo-liberal policy of just minimizing tax and public spending in recessions.
Macroeconomic policy
Note that such policies are complementary to the above mentioned structural policies aimed at favoring innovation-led growth, namely product market liberalization, labor market ‡exibility and training, and higher education reform. As well argued by Mario Draghi in his Bretton Woods speech a year ago, quantity easing and other devices to increase the ‡exibility of macroeconomic policy in the Euro area, will have little e¤ect on productivity growth if they are not accompanied by systematic structural reforms that make it easier for new …rms to enter the product market and hire on the labor market. (ii) the positive correlation between innovativeness and social mobility, is driven mainly by entrant innovators and less so by incumbent innovators, and it is dampened in states with higher lobbying intensity.
Innovation, inequality, and social mobility: making growth inclusive
In short, innovation tends to increase top income inequality, but not inequality at large 17 And moreover innovation appears to be positively correlated with social mobility. However, both, entrant innovation and social mobility are dampened by lobbying activities.
What are the implications of these …ndings for policy design aimed at making growth more inclusive?
Investing more and better in schools and universities, clearly has the e¤ect of increasing growth while also fostering social mobility. But what is more interesting in the sense that it goes against the popular view, is that structural reforms such as product and labor market liberalization, which enhance productivity growth as we have argued above, also increase social mobility to the extent that they favor innovation and creative destruction. 18 Thus the three pillars of an innovation-led growth strategy, namely (higher) education, product market ‡exibility, and labor market ‡exibility, lie at the heart of an inclusive growth strategy.
Now, what about taxation policy? There is a whole theoretical literature on how capital and labor income should be optimally taxed. However, somewhat surprisingly, very little has been done on taxation and growth, and almost nothing in the context of an economy where growth is driven by innovation. Absent growth considerations, the traditional argument against taxing capital is that this discourages savings and capital accumulation, and amounts to taxing individuals twice: once when they receive their labor income, and a second time when they collect revenues from saving their net labor income. Introducing endogenous growth may either reinforce this result (when the ‡ow of innovation is mainly driven by the capital stock) or dampen it (when innovation is mainly driven by market size which itself revolves around employees'net labor income).
A An analysis of optimal taxation policy in the context of an innovation-led economy, is beyond the scope of this paper and represents a huge new research agenda. Yet, one can learn from the tax reforms implemented in some developed countries during the past decades. In particular, it is widely acknowledge that by deciding to: (i) lower its maximal tax rate on labor income from around 90% before 1991 to 57% after 1991; (ii) move from a progressive tax schedule on capital income with a maximum marginal tax rate at 72% before 1991 to a ‡at rate of 30% after 1991, Sweden has spurred innovation-led growth (as shown by the acceleration in patenting and in productivity growth after 1991), while still maintaining public services (health, schools and universities) of high quality and available to all for free. Moreover, Sweden remains the second least unequal country worldwide.
5 Technological waves and the debate on secular stagnation
The debate
Based on the (apparent) slowing down of productivity growth in advanced countries since 2001, Gordon (2012 Gordon ( , 2013 holds that the IT revolution is over and moreover that the slowdown is there to last for a long period to come. His view is that: (i) the IT wave exhausted its growth-enhancing power; (ii) several factors make the arrival of a new wave unlikely in the near future: in particular, the demographic transition, the limits in the growth of educational attainment, the rising income and wealth inequality resulting in mounting household 1 7 In Sweden for example, the Gini has not increased over the past twenty …ve years, whereas both, patenting and top income inequality have. 1 product and labor market liberalization) required for a successful transition to innovation-based growth.
Historical wave patterns
In the remaining part of this section we take a brief look at technological waves and their di¤usion from US to other developed countries. In particular we will point at the relationship between structural reforms and a country's ability to take advantage of the new IT wave. We de…ne a technological wave as the di¤usion of new General Purpose Technologies (GPT) 19 . General Purpose Technologies (GPTs) are de…ned as generic re ‡ect market or institutional rigidities which hamper innovation-led growth more generally.
Two productivity growth waves
Using annual and quarterly data over the period 1890-2012 on labor productivity and TFP for 13 advanced countries (the G7 plus Spain, The Netherlands, Finland, Australia, Sweden and Norway) plus the reconstituted Euro area, Bergeaud, Cette and Lecat (2014) (BCL thereafter) show the existence of two big productivity growth waves during this period.
The …rst wave culminates in 1941, the second culminates in 2001. The …rst wave corresponds to the second industrial revolution: that of electricity, internal combustion and chemistry (Gordon, 2000) . The second wave is the ICT wave. That wave of smaller magnitude than the …rst, and a big question is as to whether that second wave has ended in the US. Figure 6 from Cette and Lopez (2012) shows that the Euro Area 20 and Japan su¤er from a lag in the di¤usion of technological waves compare to the US. Thus the …rst wave fully di¤used to the current euro area, Japan and the UK only post World War II. As for the second productivity wave, so far it does not show up in the Euro Area or in Japan. Market rigidities contribute to explaining such delays.
Di¤usion patterns
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And through an econometric analysis, Cette and Lopez show that this lag of ICT di¤usion in Europe and Japan, compare to the US, is explained by institutional aspects: a lower education level, on average, of the working-age population and more regulations on labour and product markets. This result means that by implementing structural reforms, these countries could bene…t from a productivity acceleration linked to a catch-up of the US ICT di¤usion level. The lower quality of research and higher education in the Euro area
and Japan compared to the US also appears to matter for explaining the di¤usion lag. These …ndings mirror those in Table 1 . % or the total GDP of the Euro Area.
Country-speci…c shocks and the role of reforms
Schumpeterian insights into R&D policy
How should the optimal R&D policy be designed? This question is at the heart of any policy debate which targets technological progress through R&D and innovation. Many governments are providing massive subsidies to foster innovation. As an example, the United States spends more than $130 billion per year at the federal level to support innovation (NSF + NIH + Army Research O¢ ce + R&D tax credit). 21 The proponents of R&D subsidy have argued that R&D has spillovers that are not internalized by the innovating …rms. The opponents claim that product market competition already provides su¢ cient incentives to …rms and that any additional subsidy would be wasteful.
In this section, summarizing the …ndings from recent research on R&D policy from the Schumpeterian growth viewpoint, we argue that there are at least two new and important aspects that the design of optimal R&D policy should consider: namely, …rm selection and the distinction between basic and applied research.
The former implies that R&D policy could a¤ect …rm survival and consequently resource reallocation between more productive and less productive …rms, or between incumbent and entrant …rms. The latter relates to the fact that di¤erent types of research, in this case basic and applied, could have di¤erent spillovers and R&D policy should take into account its impact on the distinct types of research.
R&D policies and …rm selection
The goal of R&D policies is to incentivize …rms to undertake greater R&D investment, produce more innovations, increase productivity, and create more jobs. However, these policies do not a¤ect every …rm in the economy in the same way. large …rms by their size relative to the median employment in the sample by year; and we de…ne young and old …rms by whether or not the …rm is older than ten years, then the evidence points to small and young …rms are both more R&D intensive and grow faster. 22 It then follows that industrial policies that discourage the reallocation of resources towards younger …rms might indeed be costly in that they slow the movement of R&D resources from less e¢ cient innovators (struggling incumbents) towards more e¢ cient innovators (new by allowing for high versus low ability …rms, i.e. …rms with more versus less e¢ cient R&D technologies.
Then they calibrate their model by matching empirical moments capturing key features of …rm-level R&D behavior, shipments growth, employment growth and exit, and the variation of these moments with size and age. Finally, they use the estimated model as a lab to run counterfactual experiments and test the impacts of various R&D policy designs on economic growth and welfare. The policies that we consider include a subsidy to new entrants, a subsidy to R&D by incumbents, and a subsidy for the continued operation of incumbents.
Their main …ndings can be summarized as follows. First, subsidizing incumbents reduces the equilibrium growth rate and welfare decrease. The reason is that this may prevent low-ability incumbents from exiting, thereby inhibiting the entry of high-ability …rms. Solving for the optimal policy, the authors …nd that it involves a substantial tax on the operation of incumbents, combined with an R&D subsidy to incumbents.
The reason for this result is that taxing operations makes it harder for low-type …rms to survive and forces them to exit. This way the freed-up factors of production are reallocated to high-type …rms, which make use of them much more e¤ectively.
Overall, this general equilibrium analysis, which incorporates both reallocation and selection e¤ects, highlights the fact that the economy in equilibrium might contain too many low-type …rms and policies that ignore the selection e¤ect might help low-type …rms survive. Another point that is highlighted is the fact that intertemporal spillovers are sizable and the overall R&D investment is too little. Therefore a combination of R&D subsidies and taxes on …rm operations could be an e¤ective way of providing innovation incentives to …rms, while also leveraging the selection margin in the economy.
Basic versus applied R&D
In many countries national funds allocated to basic research have been among the top items in governments' policy agendas. For instance, in a recent report by the US Congress Joint Economic Committee, it is argued that despite its value to society as a whole, basic research is underfunded by private …rms precisely because it is performed with no speci…c commercial applications in mind. The level of federal funding for basic research is deemed "worrisome" and it is claimed that it must be increased in order to overcome the underinvestment in basic research (JEC, 2010) . However the report also complains about the lack of research studies that actually quantify the extent of this underinvestment and about the lack of data. 23 For similar reasons governments introduce programs to promote collaboration between basic academic researchers and private …rms, with the hope that synergies generated from these interactions could lead to breakthrough technological advances. For instance, the United States government has aggressively promoted collaboration between universities and industrial researchers through speci…c funding programs. Among many others, Although the di¤erent characteristics of basic and applied research on the one hand and academic and corporate research on the other hand have been widely recognized to be of …rst-order importance by policy makers, these issues have received insu¢ cient attention in the economic literature on productivity and economic growth. In particular, the endogenous growth literature has mainly considered a uniform type of (applied) research and overlooked basic research investment by private …rms.
What are the key roles of basic and applied research for productivity growth? How should R&D policy be geared towards basic versus applied research? What are the incentives of private …rms to conduct basic research? How does academic research contribute to innovation and productivity growth? Akcigit, Hanley and Serrano-Velarde (2014) provide a …rst attempt at answering these questions. In order to understand the potential ine¢ ciencies involved in di¤erent types of research investments and to design appropriate industrial policies to address them, it is necessary to adopt a structural framework that explicitly models the incentives for di¤erent types of research investments by private …rms. Akcigit et al (2014) take an important step toward developing this theoretical framework, identifying the potential spillovers, and studying their macroeconomic implications for innovation policy.
Their analysis starts from the observation that countries allocate a signi…cant share of their GDP to R&D (around 2-3%). The question then is: which fraction of it goes to basic versus applied research? The interesting fact is that almost half of overall spending goes into basic research. These correlations are robust to a large variety of potential confounding factors. This result suggests that cross-industry spillovers are sizable and using the variation in …rms' technology base, we can estimate the cross-industry spillovers associated with basic research.
In order to study the policy implications of these spillovers, Akcigit et al (2014) build a general equilibrium, multi-industry framework with private …rms and a public research sector. Firms conduct both basic and applied research, whereas the public sector focuses exclusively on basic research. In their model, basic research generates fundamental technological innovations and generates spillovers, both within and across industries, that a¤ect subsequent applied innovations. 25 In line with the "Ivory Tower" theory of academic research, basic research by private …rms in this model will turn into consumer products faster than that undertaken by public research labs. Applied research, on the other hand, will be done only by private …rms and will generate follow-on innovations building on the existing basic knowledge stock.
The authors then undertake a quantitative investigation of the impacts of various innovation policies on the aggregate economy. They …rst estimate the model by targeting some of the key moments in the data, especially public and private spending on basic and applied research in France. Then they use the estimated model to assess the extent of ine¢ ciencies in basic and applied research and to study the implications of several important innovation policies.
Their main results can be summarized as follows. First, a large fraction of spillovers from basic research across industries are not internalized. As a result, there is a dynamic misallocation of research e¤orts, which reduces welfare signi…cantly. One striking result is that the decentralized economy and the social planner's economy are using overall the same level of resources for research. However, the composition of the total research e¤ort is very distinct. While the social planner is allocating more resources to basic research, it allocates less resources to applied research. This implies that the dominant misallocation here is not that between production and research, but among the various types of research activities, in this case, applied and basic research. There is actually overinvestment in applied research in the decentralized economy because of product market competition, whereas there is underinvestment in basic research due to uninternalized within-industry and cross-industry spillovers.
This raises an important question: to what extent can public policies address this ine¢ ciency? The …rst policy we analyze is a uniform research subsidy to private …rms. In this environment, subsidizing overall private research is ine¤ective since this will oversubsidize applied research, which is already excessive due to product market competition. Therefore, the welfare improvement from such a subsidy is limited, unless the policymaker is able to discriminate between types of research projects at the …rm level, a di¢ cult task in the real world.
The authors then analyze another policy tool: the level of funding for public research labs. We show that due to the Ivory Tower nature of public basic research, allocating more money to the academic sector without giving property rights to the researchers (ownership over their inventions) is not necessarily a good idea. To demonstrate this, they simulate a policy similar to the Bayh-Dole Act enacted in the US in 1980. They consider alternative scenarios in which public researchers have no property rights, then 50% and 100% property rights.
And they …nd a complementarity between the level of property rights and the optimal allocation of resources to academic research. The optimal combination turns out to grant full property rights to the academic researcher and allocating a larger fraction of GDP to public research. This reduces the welfare gap signi…cantly.
The role of freedom and openness in the innovation process
How do incentives and organizations a¤ect the probability and nature of innovation? As well explained by Pierre Azoulay in his lecture notes, providing incentives for producing ideas is problematic for at least three reasons. First, ex ante it is di¢ cult to describe the innovation in advance. Second, ex post property rights on innovations may be di¢ cult to enforce (for example, how do we enforce patent breadth). Third, innovation e¤orts are hard to observe and verify.
In short, a contract for future innovation is bound to be an incomplete contract, one whereby the contracting parties allocate property rights on the realized innovation and/or decision rights on the innovation process, leaving much of the revenue sharing to expost bargaining 26 .
In this section we explore one particular implication of contractual incompleteness, namely the issue of how to allocate control rights on the choice of research agenda in the context of multi-stage research lines.
This leads us to revisit the role of intellectual property (IP) versus academic freedom and openness in the innovation process.
The ADS framework and the role of academic freedom
The incentives of academics are known to be di¤erent from those of private researchers (see Dasgupta and David, 1990 Each stage on the research line requires one researcher, and that researcher succeeds with probability p if she follows a (success-maximizing) practical strategy at that stage. Instead of the practical strategy, the researcher may choose to follow an "alternative" strategy which yields a zero probability of success. One interpretation is that the alternative strategy may be the one that the researcher enjoys more, even though it does not pay o¤ in monetary terms. Another interpretation is that the alternative strategy may help initiate new lines but does not generate progress on the initial line.
There is an in…nite supply of researchers at each stage, each of whom has an outside option R that she can obtain by working in another profession. After being exposed to idea I j 1 , each researcher at stage j decides whether she would better enjoy following the practical strategy or the alternative strategy. If she is able to undertake her favored strategy, she su¤ers no disutility from working. However, if the researcher has to undertake the strategy that she likes less, she su¤ers a disutility of z. The ex ante probability that a given researcher prefers to follow the practical strategy is given by . ADS assume that the choice of the practical vs. the alternative strategy is ex ante non-contractible. In other words, one cannot write a contract that promises a bonus for following the practical strategy, because the nature of work that strategy entails cannot be adequately described ahead of time.
If the researcher is employed by a university which leaves her with full control rights over the choice of research strategy (the "researcher-freedom" regime), in equilibrium, she is paid the reservation wage w f reedom = R, and always works on her preferred strategy. This implies that with probability , the scientist works on the practical strategy, and with probability (1 ), she works on the alternative strategy.
Therefore, the ex-ante probability of advancing to the next stage is given by p.
Suppose instead that the researcher is employed by a centralized …rm who has full control rights on the choice of research agenda. Then, ex-post, the manager has the authority to force the researcher to work on the practical strategy. Anticipating this, the researcher will demand a wage of w f irm = R + (1 )z in order to work under this "manager-control"regime. The (1 )z markup over the researcher-freedom regime represents compensation for loss of creative freedom-the fact that the researcher now must always adopt the practical strategy, whether this turns out to coincide with her preferences or not.
ADS show that it is optimal to allocate control rights on the research agenda (i.e. to grant academic freedom) in early stages of the research line, as this reduces the cost of research (the researcher asks for w f reedom = R instead of w f irm = R + (1 )z), whereas for later stages in the research line focus on the practical strategy becomes paramount, so that it is optimal to have research performed within a …rm.
More generally, whether the researcher will or will not enjoy control rights -i.e. real authority-over her research agenda, will depend upon how strongly she is monitored by the …rm that employs her.
For example, consider a two-stage research process. In each stage i = 1; 2 the …rm owner hires a scientist, and agrees to pay her a wage of w pi . Next, the …rm owner invests e¤ort in trying to become informed about the project. For an e¤ort cost of 2 =2, the …rm owner has a probability of becoming informed. If she is informed, she is then able to force the scientist to follow the practical strategy. However, if she is uninformed, the entrepreneur is unable to direct the scientist, and the scientist is thus free to do what she wants.
It is easy to show that: (i) the more the researcher is being monitored by the …rm, the higher the wage the researcher will ask to compensate for her loss of control rights; (ii) it is optimal to grant more freedom to the researcher in the earlier stage (here, in stage i = 1) of the research process.
To prove these two claims, note that the payo¤ to the …rm owner if she is informed at stage i is:
whereas the payo¤ to the …rm owner if she is uninformed at stage i is:
so that the marginal value of being informed at stage i is (1 )p i+1 , and the …rm owner's equilibrium probability of becoming informed at this stage is:
It follows that the unconditional expected payo¤ at stage i is given by:
where the wage w pi is itself determined as:
Proving (i) and (ii) is now straightforward: …rst, from (2) , as the project is getting closer to completion, the likelihood that the …rm owner becomes informed and therefore imposes her choice of research strategy to the scientist increases, since i+1 goes up with i; second, from (3) we immediately get that the scientist's wage also increases, to compensate for the fact that he has less de facto creative control. In other words, research …rms endogenously become more hands on in later stages of research projects.
Freedom and openness
Another implication of the ADS framework, is that openness should play an important role in early stage research, whereas later stages in the research process are bound to be more "proprietary". Indeed, when granted academic freedom, researchers are free to explore alternative strategies which may lead to the creation of new research lines that those researchers may not pursue. Then there is value in having other researchers freely access the knowledge that will enable them to pursue these new research lines. Openness is less justi…ed in later stages of the research process when research is more focused and also closer to commercialization.
More formally, consider two parallel research lines, 1 and 2, each of which operates as described above.
Namely, with ex ante probability the researcher initially allocated to the current stage of either of these two lines, prefers to pursue the practical strategy for that line whereas with probability (1 ) he prefers not to pursue this practical strategy. Now openness implies that the scientist on line 1 can learn about project 2 and vice-versa, and that consequently with positive probability ', she may choose to work on the practical strategy for project 2 if nobody else does. A greater degree of openness implies a higher value of ':
What openness does, is to increase the net present value of a research line operated under freedom from
However, openness has no value when the …rm owner controls the researcher's agenda, since the researcher is always forced to work on the practical strategy in that case. Thus we still have:
Hence:
which in turn will lead to a lower equilibrium value of i (particularly for lower i's) and therefore to more freedom (particularly at earlier stages on the research line) and thus to more new lines being created. As a result, a higher fraction of researchers will be working on early stages of research lines, hence there will be more basic research.
Evidence on the limits of IP and the role of openness and freedom
The above model generates the following predictions:
Prediction 1: Earlier stages of research should be managed in a more decentralized way, leaving more freedom to researchers.
There is some empirical research speaking to this prediction, although indirectly. 
Towards a new Growth Pact in Europe
The above discussion suggests some directions for a new growth package for EU and in particular countries in the Euro area: (i) structural reforms starting with the liberalization of product and labor markets: here we will argue that an important role can be played by structural funds provided the targeting and governance of these funds is suitably modi…ed; (ii) industrial investments along the lines suggested by our above discussion on vertical targeting; (iii) more ‡exible macroeconomic policies (budgetary and monetary) at EU level.
Structural reforms and the role of structural funds
There is a broad consensus among European leaders regarding the importance of structural reforms, in particular product and labor market liberalization and higher education reform, to foster long run growth Europe.
In this section we …rst assess the potential increase in growth potential from having all Eurozone countries converge fully or partly to the best standards with regard to product or labor market liberalization, and also with regard to higher education. In the second part of the section we discuss the role that structural funds might play in encouraging such reforms.
Assessing the growth e¤ects of structural reforms
As in Aghion et al (2009c) one can look at the e¤ect of structural policies using cross-country panel regressions across 21 European countries. Our structural indicators are the following: For higher education system : the share of the 25-64 years old population having completed tertiary education (SUP); for product market : an OECD index assessing product market regulation (PMR); for labor market : an OECD index assessing the strictness of employment protection (LPE). In fact we focus on the interaction between these two rigidities, 2 7 Speci…cally, in 1998 and 1999, the National Institutes of Health negotiated two Memoranda of Understanding with the …rm DuPont, which granted academic researchers low-cost, royalty-free and independent access to both the use of DuPont's methods and to the transgenic mice associated with them through the Jackson Laboratory, a non-pro…t research mice repository.
namely the variable PMR*LPE, in the analysis of labor and product market reforms. Indeed, there are good reasons to believe the e¤ects of liberalizing product markets are complementary to those of liberalizing labor markets: for example, making entry in a new activity easier is of lesser value to an entrepreneur if she cannot hire new employees to work on that activity.
We can look at the short-and long-run growth e¤ects of converging towards the performance levels of "target countries". The target groups include those countries which are found to be the 'best performers' in terms of education, product and labor market regulations. In order to determine these groups, we rank countries according to the variables SUP and PMR*LPE and we come up with two target groups: NonEuropean target group: USA and Canada; European target group: UK, Ireland and Denmark. The advantage of these two target groups is that they allow comparisons between countries within the European Union as well as with non European counterparts. Interestingly, we found the same target groups both for the higher education and the labor and product market regulation. Then we can assess the average e¤ect of converging towards best practice for the eurozone (EMU) as a whole. Our results are that converging towards the best practice in terms of product and labor market liberalization generates a growth gain of between 0.3 and 0.4 already in the short run. Converging towards the best practice in terms of higher education enrollment generates a growth gain which is initially smaller (if we take the UK, Ireland and Denmark as the reference countries), but grows up to 0.6 by 2050. Altogether, a full percentage point in growth can be gained through structural convergence towards those three countries.
Rethinking the role and design of Structural Funds
Here we argue that structural funds can be partly reoriented towards facilitating the implementation of structural reforms. So far, these funds have been used mainly to …nance medium-term investment projects and to fostering socio-economic cohesion within the EU. Moreover, these funds are allocated ex ante based on recipient countries'GDP relative to the EU average, population and surface.
We argue in favour of an alternative approach both to the goals, targeting and governance of Structural Funds. On the goals of Structural Funds: These funds should become transformative, in other words they should help achieve structural reforms in the sectors they are targeted to. In our above discussion, we identi…ed some main areas (areas or sectors?) where structural reforms are needed: labor markets, product markets and education. Structural funds should aim at facilitating changes in the functioning of these sectors in the various countries. The allocation of funds should generally be made on an individual basis: in other words, they should mainly target schools, employment agencies, individual workers, not so much countries. The funds would help …nance transition costs. The allocation of funds should be to well-speci…ed deliverables (provision of better tutorship in education, improvements in the organization of employment agencies, transition to portable pensions rights across two or more countries, setting up of diploma equivalence for service jobs,. . . ) and should be also conditional upon the country or region not having put in place a general policy that contradicts the purpose of the fund allocation.
Now regarding the governance of Structural Funds, the allocation of funds should be made by European agencies on the model of the European Research Council: bottom up approach with peer evaluation ex ante and ex post.
Rethinking industrial policy in the EU
Growth in the EU also requires adequate vertical targeting, both by member states and at EU level. In the previous sections we have emphasized the view that horizontal targeting should be given priority: basic and applied research, higher education, labor mobility. But, in light of our discussion in the previous sections, we also believe that well governed vertical targeting by member states and at EU level can help foster growth further within the EU.
At EU level, infrastructure investments in transportation, energy, and broadband network should greatly contribute to increasing product market competition in local markets. In other words, proper vertical targeting at EU level can help enhance horizontal policies in member states. Another justi…cation for privileging vertical targeting at EU level, is that targeting at EU level is more likely to preserve product market competition when the targeted activities involve important …xed costs. What we mean here, is that subsidizing activities with high …xed costs at local level (i.e. at the level of one particular country) often boils down to subsidizing one particular …rm, which in turn defeats the purpose of reconciling industrial policy with the need to enhance product market competition. This consideration becomes less binding when vertical targeting is done at EU level, since at EU level it is easier to …nd more than one potential recipient of vertical subsidies, including for activities involving high …xed costs. the allocation and governance of that aid. In other words, the Commission should move from an "ex ante", legalistic, approach to sectoral state aid to an "ex post", pragmatic, approach where state aid is sanctionned only when it can be proved that it resulted in lowering product market competition in the corresponding activity.
Whether at EU level or by member states, vertical targeting should be adequately designed and governed.
In the previous section we mentioned the recent paper by Nunn and Tre ‡er (2009) suggesting that sectoral aid is more likely to be growth-enhancing if it target sectors with higher growth potential, one measure of it being the extent to which various industries are skill-biased. We also mentioned the work by Aghion et al (2013) suggesting that vertical targeting is more growth-enhancing if it targets activities with higher degree of product market competition and enhance product market competition within the sector. 28 
More ‡exible macroeconomic policies at EU level
In previous sections we have argued that more countercyclical macroeconomic policies can help (creditconstrained) …rms maintain R&D and other types of innovation-enhancing investments over the business cycle. One implication of this for European growth policy design, is that all the debt and de…cit targets (both in the short and in the long term) should be corrected for cyclical variations, in other words they should always be stated in structural terms. Thus, for example if a country's current growth rate is signi…cantly below trend, then the short run budgetary targets should be relaxed so as to allow this country to maintain its growth enhancing investments. However, while the …scal compact speci…es long-term objectives that are stated in structural terms, the short and medium term targets agreed between the European Commission and member states last year, are in nominal terms. This inconsistency is damageable to growth.
Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to show how theoretical models of growth and innovation can deliver testable predictions and also policy recommendations. Our emphasis has been on the Schumpeterian approach where each innovation induces positive knowledge spillovers on subsequent research but also destroys rents from previous innovations. A second and related avenue for future research is to look in more details at innovation-led growth, …rm dynamics and reallocation in developing economies. Recent empirical evidence (see Klenow 2009, 2012 ) has shown that misallocation of resources is a major source of productivity gap across countries. What are the causes of misallocation, why do these countries lack creative destruction which would eliminate the ine¢ cient …rms? Schumpeterian theory with …rm dynamics could be an invaluable source to shed light on these important issues that lie at the core of the development puzzle.
A third avenue is to look at the role of …nance in innovation-led growth. Recent studies point at equity …nance being more growth-enhancing in more frontier economies. More generally, we still need to better understand how di¤erent types of …nancial instruments map with di¤erent sources of growth and di¤erent types of innovation activities. Also, we need to better understand why we observe a surge of …nance during the acceleration phase in the di¤usion of new technological waves, and also how …nancial sectors evolve when the waves taper o¤.
A fourth avenue is to analyze in greater depth the relationship between innovation, income inequality and social mobility, and to gather new data on individual patenting and revenues to look at how taxation policy a¤ects the ‡ow and nature of innovation and the mobility of innovators. These and many other microeconomic aspects of innovation and growth await further research. United States
